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Petitioner KENNETH ZERAN respectfully prays that 
based upon significant questions as to the construction and 
application of Section 230 of the Communications Decency 
Act (the "CDA") stated in the Questions Presented herein this 
Court grant a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit which 
affirmed entry by the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Virginia of judgment on the pleadings 
dismissing ZERAN's pending action under Rule 12(c) of the 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 
OPINIONS BELOW 
The Order of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit denying Petitioner's motion for rehearing 
with suggestion for en bane review without opinion has not 
been reported but in reproduced in the Appendix. (App. A-
19) The Order of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit affu1l1ing the United States Distriet Court for 
the Eastern District of Virginia was reported at 129 F.3d 327 
(4th Cir. 1997) (App. A). 
The Order of the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Virginia dismissing the action was reported 
at 958 F.Supp. 1124 (E.D.Va. 1997). 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Fourth Circuit ("Court of Appeals") was entered on 
November 12, 1997. The Order of the Court of Appeals 
denying Petitioner's timely motion for rehearing with 
suggestion for en bane review was dated and entered 
December 9, 1997. (App. B). 
The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.c. § 
1254(1). 
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STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED 
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act 
reads as follows: 
Section 230. PROTECTION FOR PRIVATE BLOCKING 
AND SCREENING OF OFFENSIVE MATERIAL. 
(b) It is the policy of the United States--
(5) to ensure vigorous enforcement of Federal 
criminal laws to deter and punish trafficking in 
obscenity, stalking and harassment by means of 
computer. 
(c) Protection for 'good samaritan' blocking and 
screening of offensive material. 
(1) Treatment of publisher or speaker 
No provider or user of an interactive computer 
service shall be treated as the publisher or 
speaker of any information provided by another 
information content provider. 
(2) Civil liability 
No provider or user of an interactive computer 
service shall be held liable on account of: 
(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to 
restrict access to or availability of material that 
the provider or user considers to be obscene 
lewd lascivious filthy, excessively violent, 
harassing or otherwise objectionable whether or 
not such material is constitutionally protected' or 
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(B) any action taken to enable or make available 
to inforrnaticm content providers or others the 
technical means to restrict access to material 
described in paragraph (1). 
(d) Effect on other laws 
(1) No effect on criminal law 
Nothing in this section shall be construed to 
impair the enforcement of section 223 of this 
title chapter 71 (relating to obscenity) or 11 0 
(relating to sexual exploitation of children) of 
Title 18, or any other criminal statute. 
. . .... 
(3) State Law 
Nothing in this section shall be construed to 
prevent any state from enforcing any State law 
that is consistent with this section. No cause of 
action may be brought and no liability may be 
imposed under any State or local law that is 
inconsistent with this section. 
47 U.S.c. § 223 provides: 
Obscene or harassing telephone calls in the 
District of Columbia or in interstate or foreign 
communications 
(a) Prohibited general purposes 
Whoever--
(1) in interstate or foreign communications 
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(C) makes a telephone call or utilizes a 
telecommunication device, whether or not the 
conversation or communication ensues, without 
disclosing his identity and with intent to annoy, 
abuse, threaten, or harass any person at the called 
number or who receives the communication. 
shall be fmed under Title 18, or imprisoned not 
more than two years, or both. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Two fundamental questions are presented by this case: 
(1) whether Section 230(c) of the CDA, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c), 
can be properly construed to immunize proprietary computer 
online service providers ("OSPs") from state common law 
negligence liability, by absolving them from any legal duty to 
injured parties in their capacity as distributors of defamatory, 
fraudulent, harassing, or otherwise injurious subject matter 
after receiving actual notice that such subject matter was being 
posted on their own proprietary bulletin boards, and (2) 
whether the CDA which became effective February 6, 1996, 
was properly invoked to bar a claim which arose during April 
and May of 1995, but which was not filed until after the 
effective date of the CDA. 
For purposes of this Petition it is accepted that 
Respondent AMERICA ONLINE, INC. ("AOL") failed to use 
reasonable care to expeditiously delete the offending posting, 
prevent its reposting or post an appropriate notice itself of the 
bogus nature of the subject matter. 
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A. Procedural Background and The Complaint 
ZERAN filed his complaint on April 23, 1996, in the 
United States District Court for the Western District of 
Oklahoma. l Discovery ensued. Respondent AOL moved to 
dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b )( 6) of the 
Fed.R.Civ.P. and/or to transfer the action to the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. The motion 
to transfer was granted and the motion to dismiss reserved for 
the transferee court and the case was then transferred on 
October 28, 1996. Discovery continued. Respondent next 
moved pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Fed.R.Civ.P. for 
judgment on the pleadings and concurrently withdrew its 
Motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the 
Fed.R.Civ.P. Oral argument was held on the motion on 
February 28, 1997, after which the District Court stayed 
discovery. The court granted AOL's motion on March 21, 
1997. 
ZERAN's complaint averred that ZERAN, an 
accomplished artist, photographer, filmmaker, and 
interviewer, operating out of his home in Seattle, Washington, 
publicized his telephone in connection with various 
businesses. 
On April 25, 1995, in the wake of the unprecedented 
terrorist act in the April 19th bombing of the Murrah building 
in Oklahoma City, an unidentified AOL user posted on AOL 
bulletin boards the availability for sale "Naughty Oklahoma 
T-Shirts" which listed the notice to be "From: Ken ZZ03,,2, 
I On January 4, 1996, before the effective date of the CDA, alleging 
facts identical to those contained in the AOL Complaint, plaintiff sued an 
Oklahoma City radio station that broadcast the original AOL posting. (cf. 
Ex. A and Ex. B to AOL's Brief in Support of Its Rule 12 Motion to 
Dismiss or, In The Alternative, To Transfer). 
2 "Ken ZZ03" is a "screen name" utilized by AOL members, the true 
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giving ZERAN's Seattle business phone. ZERAN, never 
having been an AOL member, first discovered the existence 
of the posting from a journalist that had located it on the 
bulletin board of the Michigan Military Movement. The 
listing was a vicious, cruel hoax designed to generate outrage 
at the purported seller in all those who read it or heard about 
it. 3 
When ZERAN was notified of the posting, that same 
day he notified AOL both by telephone and later by letter 
requesting that the posting be deleted and that appropriate 
notice be placed on AOL that the posting was bogus.4 AOL 
identity of the member being generally known only to AOL. AOL 
maintains a database with the name, addresses, phone numbers and credit 
card numbers of each member searchable by screen name. In the case of 
the person posting the "Naughty Oklahoma T-Shirts", he was able to 
provide false information to AOL so as to avoid detection, because AOL 
did not verify member information before allowing the new member to go 
online utilizing one of the trial memberships that AOL disseminated by the 
millions through direct mail, in magazines and books and loaded 011 to the 
hard disks of new computers. AOL's irial memberships offering free hours 
of OIl-line time are so ubiquitous that the court and its staff have 
undoubtedly received more than one. ill the case of Ken Z033, after that 
membership he fraudulenUy obtained was terminated, be used at least two 
more AOL memberships with bogus information and similar screen names 
(Ken ZZ033 and Ken Z033) to post increasingly offensive items for sale. 
3 At a time when bodies were still being dug out of the rubble of the 
Murrah bombing and funerals for victims were being conducted by the 
dozens, the "naughty" t-shirts included the slogans "Rack'em, Stack'em and 
Pack'em-Oklaboma \995", "Putting the Kids to bed . . . Oklahoma 1995" 
and "McVeigh for President 1996". Subsequent bogus postillgs added 
"Forget the rescue let the maggors take over-Oklahoma 1995" and "Finally 
a day care center that can keep the kids quiet-Oklahoma 1995". Zeran, 
958 F.Supp. at 1127 n. 5. 
4 Since he was not an AOL member, Petitioner had no capability to 
respond to these postings with his own disclaimers of his innocence p]aced 
throughout the AOL system. Since he was not an AOL member, Petitioner 
is in a very different position from AOL members and AOL's refusal to 
post such disclaimers was a breach of its duty of care to Petitjoner. 
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declined to post any such notice on its system and the posting 
remained on andlor was reposted with slightly different screen 
names, always using ZERAN's telephone number, for at least 
a week. As a result of AOL's failure to expeditiously delete 
the posting andlor prevent the repeated further postings bl 
failing to take adequate electronic blocking measures 
ZERAN's telephone was tied up with obscene, harassing 
telephone calls and he endured the further dissemination of 
the bogus posting attributed to him through a radio broadcast 
on an Oklahoma City station on May 1, 1995, which 
generated extremely violent, aggressive phone calls including 
numerous death threats. 
ZERAN sued AOL for negligence as a distributor for 
failure to exercise a reasonable standard of care to protect 
ZERAN from the foreseeable consequences of the bogus 
posting. ZERAN averred in his complaint that AOL owed a 
duty of care as a substantial commercial operator of its own 
computer bulletin board, after receiving actual notice of the 
offending posting, to take appropriate remedial action such as 
screening out the incendiaryandlor bogus material as well as 
his telephone number posted on its computer bulletin board 
service. The complaint expressly averred that AOL was on 
constructive notice by reason of the law enunciated in Cubby, 
lnc. v. Co mpuServe, lnc. el al. 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 
1991) that it was obligated after due notice to be able to 
screen incendiary, defamatory andlor bogus material a 
standard applied to interactive computer services providers in 
their capacity as distributors of infonnation as determined in 
5 Petitioner alleged that readily available internal computer procedures 
and/or computer programs existed which would have allowed AOL to 
block any further attempts to place more postings on AOL using 
Petitioner's phone number. With a blocking program in effect, any such 
Ken Z postings would have been intercepted by AOL before they appeared 
on AOL's service. Liabllity for negligence in adopting blocking measures 
is one of Petitioner's distributor theories. 
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Cubby, Inc. 6 
With the significant exception of the court's 
characterization of this case as one involving the Internet 7, the 
facts were fairly presented by the District Court. By way of 
emphasis the facts establish that AOL had actual notice of the 
damaging bogus posting on its proprietary computer bulletin 
board through the direct notification by ZERAN himself to 
AOL's personnel, both oral and by letter. Secondly ZERAN 
was not a member of AOL and had no standing or ability to 
protect himself as to the bogus posting using his first name, 
distinctive initial and telephone number. Thirdly, the 
averments that AOL had the capability or should have had the 
capability of screening and blocking the bogus posting, after 
having received actual notice, is deemed true. 
That the complaint fairly states a claim for negligence 
based upon the standard applied to a distributor (as compared 
with a publisher) of content is not at issue. 958 F. Supp. 1124 
(E.D. Va.), affd. 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997). 
6 Both courts below insisted on casting Petitioner's claim as a defamation 
claim (e.g. "Although Zeran artfully attempts to plead his claims as ones of 
negligence ... ", 129 F.3d at 332), despite Petitioner's specific allegations 
of fault-based acts which breached common law duties of care imposed on 
AOL. Moreover, the "artfully" comment which implies some last-minute 
attempt to plead around § 230, ignores the specific rebuttal to similar 
assertions by AOL, including letters from Petitioner's counsel to AOL 
asserting distributor negligence months before the CDA was adopted. (see 
Brief in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings 
at 6-8, especially Exs. D, June 26, 1995, letter and E, August 4, 1995, letter 
to the Affidavit of Leo Kayser, III). 
7As more fully discussed below, this case involves a private, proprietary, 
member-only OSP with many features unique to AOL and strict rules 
governing member online conduct-a stark contrast to the free-for-all nature 
of the Internet characterized by the court. 958 F.Supp. at 1126, ft. I. 
Indeed, the use of OSPs such as AOL as a gateway to the Internet (no one 
can get into AOL from the Internet except AOL members) is completely 
irrelevant to the events of this case. 
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The District Court in granting AOL's motion for 
judgment on the pleadings equated publisher liability with 
distributor liability for purposes of § 230( c) of the CDA, even 
though § 230(c) does not use the word distributor or in any 
way indicate the intent of Congress to overrule Cubby, Inc., 
supra, which held computer service providers to be treated as 
distributors and not as publishers for purposes of liability with 
respect to injurious content posted on their proprietary 
systems. The import of Cubby, Inc. was to absolve such 
providers from any legal duty to screen, block or otherwise 
edit in the course of postings or transmissions any of the 
content that might appear on their systems in the absence of 
notice. On the other hand, with notice, such providers still had 
a duty to persons who foreseeably could be injured due to 
content posted on their systems on the analogous basis of a 
bookstore, news vendor, or library. 
B. Background Prior to Enactment of 
Section 230 of the CDA 
The scienter standard as applied to distributors of 
content is compelled by the First Amendment as noted by the 
Cubby, Inc. court: 
The requirement that a distributor must have 
knowledge of the contents of a publication before 
liability can be imposed for distributing that 
publication is deeply rooted in the First 
Amendment, made applicable to the states 
through the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 139. 
(Emphasis added, citing Smith v. California, 361 
U.S. 147 (1959)). 
Then, in 1995 Stratton-Oakmont Inc. v. Prodigy 
Service Co., Inc., 1995 WL 323710 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. May 24, 
1995) was decided, in which that court held that a cyberspace 
10 
distributor, in part, because it was prescreening some content 
for distasteful words, was held to be a publisher and, thus, 
strictly liable for false information published on one of its 
bulletin boards. Unlike, ZERAN, no notice had been given to 
Prodigy of the allegedly false information by 
Stratton-Oakmont or anyone else. 
The legislative history on § 230 of the CDA 
demonstrates expressly that the purpose of § 230, was to 
overrule Stratton-Oakmont, supra, and encourage computer 
services providers to edit, screen out or block offensive 
content without risk of exposure to liability as a publisher. 
stated: 
Specifically, the Conference Report on Section 230 
One of the specific purposes of [Section 230] is 
to overrule Stratton-Oakmont v. Prodigy and any 
other similar decisions which have treated such 
providers and users as publishers or speakers of 
content that is not their own because they have 
restricted access to objectionable material. 
(Emphasis added.) 
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-458, at 194 (1996). The headings for 
§ 230 and § 230( c) quoted above, make it express that the 
purpose of the statute is to provide protection for "private 
blocking and screening of offensive material" and for "Good 
Samaritan Blocking and Screening" consistent with the 
overruling of Stratton-Oakmont. Nothing in § 230(c) overrules 
the actual notice standard for distributorship liability 
enunciated in Cubby, Inc. 
C. Decisions of the District Court and Fourth Circuit 
The District Court rested its decision on two grounds 
concluding that the term "publisher or speaker" which is not 
11 
defined in the CDA or its legislative history, encompasses 
distributors, such as AOL. Secondly, the trial court 
determined that the Congressional intent of promoting content 
monitoring would be undermined unless distribution liability 
was deemed preempted. 
The Fourth Circuit adopted the District Court's 
conclusions, but went well beyond the statute and legislative 
history in finding a broad objective to promote free speech in 
a provision of the CDA crafted to encourage content screening 
and blocking of certain content. 
D. The Lower Courts Have Misconstrued The Statute 
Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals 
exaggerated the burden placed on OSPs like AOL which 
would arise from imposing distributor liability on them based 
upon Petitioner's claim. Whereas because of the many 
transmissions daily it would be virtually impossible for either 
an Internet Service Provider ("ISP") or major OSP to screen 
them in advance (consistent with the duty of a publisher), 
because of the availability of electronic means such as 
blocking programs (alleged in the Complaint), proprietary 
OSP's like AOL can meet the demands of distributor liability 
(need to act arises only after notice) regardless of the volume 
of their system traffic. This distinction supports § 230(c) as 
having been designed by Congress to impact only publishers 
and to avoid the Prodigy case results-a distinction that escaped 
both the District Court and the Court of Appeals. 
Moreover both Courts' construction of an 
impossibility of meeting the duty of a distributor in addition 
to having inconectly supplied a intent for Congress that is 
patently missing from the Act jtself (i.e. Congress was aware 
of the publisher and distributor dichotomy from Stratton-
Oakmont and Cubby, Inc. and could have easily added 
"distributor" in § 230(c)(1), but did not do so) the Circuit 
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Court also necessarily pronounces the policy behind § 230 as 
being a futile goal. 
1. Section 230( c)( 1) 
Although the term publisher is not defined in the 
statute legislative history shows that Congress was concerned 
about publisher liability as imposed in Stratton-Oakmont 
supra, wherein the court there expressly distinguished between 
publishers, on the one hand, and distributors, such as AOL. It 
was this narrow definition, and not a broader definition taken 
from the Restatement of Torts relied upon by the lower courts, 
that Congress intended to incorporate in the CDA. Secondly, 
the policy of promoting online content screening would be 
furthered not undern1ined if § 230(c) were construed to allow 
distributor liability because of the effect of subsection (2) of 
the Good Samaritan exemption which the Fourth Circuit 
failed to address. The intent of Congress was to codify the 
standard set forth in Cubby, Inc. 
The Fourth Circuit also engaged in a sweeping policy 
declaration, divorced from any specific reference to § 230 or 
legislative history that: 
If computer service providers were subject to 
distributor liability, they would face liability each 
time they receive notice of a potentially 
defamatory statement--from any party, concerning 
any message.8 
8 Contrary to the Cirouit Court's assertion of the burden on OSPs by 
treating AOL as a distributor, AOL asserted itself to be a distributor and 
not a publisher (see' 2.7. to Addendum to Plaintiff's Petition for Rehearing 
and Suggestion for Hearing En Banc) and AOL had already specifically 
reserved the right to itself to police its service and terminate memberships 
for improper conduct in violation of detailed Terms of Service and Rules of 
the Road. (, 8.2, Id.). 
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In making this analysis as a matter of policy, the 
Fourth Circuit has manifestly departed from any accepted rule 
of judicial construction and invaded the province of the 
legislature in its rationale for affirming the District Court on 
such reasoning. The construction of § 230 of the CDA does 
not represent a faithful interpretation of congressional intent. 
Section 230 was plainly intended to encourage interactive 
computer services to restrict access to injurious content. 9 
Under the rule announced below, computer service providers 
would be completely immune from any liability, and therefore 
would have no incentive to respond to notification by parties, 
especially non-AOL members, being injured by posted 
content-especially those posted anonymously because of 
AOL's corporate policy of allowing prospective "members" to 
go online before their identity is confirmed. 
2. Section 230(d)(3) 
Congress has expressly limited the impact of the CDA 
on existing state laws by providing that only those state laws 
inconsistent with the other subparts of the section are 
unenforceable. Congress provided specific restrictions on 
liability of an "interactive computer service" to either "actions 
taken in good faith to restrict access to the availability" of 
9 In a floor colloquy between the House authors, Congressman Cox 
stated: 
Currently, however, there is a tremendous disincentive for online 
service providers to create family friendly services by detecting 
and removing objectionable content. These providers face the risk 
of increased liability if they police their systems. . . The Cox-
Wyden amendment removes the liability of providers such as 
Prodigy who currently make a good faith effort to edit the smut 
from their systems. 141 Congo Rec. H 8460, 8471 (August 5, 
1995). 
Contrary to the clear purpose of the CDA, the effect of the 
Circuit's decision is to reward OSPs like AOL that do absolutely nothing-
the proverbial "Bad Samaritan". 
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certain material (§ 230(c)(2)(A» or "any action taken to 
enable or make available to infonnation content providers or 
others technical means to restrict access to material described 
in paragraph (1)." (§ 230(c)(2)(B». 
Given these limitations on the immunity provided by 
the CDA, imposing liability on AOL for its negligence under 
traditional state tort principles is not inconsistent with the 
purpose of the Act. 
E. The Petitioner's Claims Were Not Barred 
Even Though the Petitioner's Suit Was 
Filed After the Effective Date of the CDA. 
The events which give rise to negligence liability for 
AOL under traditional state tort concepts occurred in April 
and early May, 1995. The CDA was signed into law in 
February, 1996. Long prior to adoption of the CDA, plaintiff 
was setting forth the operative facts of this case and asserting 
his entitlement to damages from AOL under theories of 
liability then cognizable. 
The issue before this Court is the impact of both 
Landgrafv. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 114 S.Ct. 1483 
(1994) and Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Us. ex rei. Schumer, 
U.S. _, 117 S.Ct. 1871 (1997) and whether the Court will 
further extend its retroactivity jurisprudence. 
In Landgraf and its companion case, Rivers v. 
Roadway Exp., Inc., 511 U.S. 298,114 S.Ct. 1510 (1994), the 
Court considered whether two sections of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1991 should be given retroactive effect to a decision on 
appeal. The initial inquiry is whether Congress has provided 
for such a retroactive effect. The court observed: 
When a case implicates a federal statute enacted 
after the events in suit, the court's first task is to 
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detennine whether Congress has expressly 
prescribed the statute's proper reach. If Congress 
has done so, of course, there is no need to resort to 
judicial default rules. Id. at 1505. 10 
In Landgraf the court meticulously reviewed the 
legislative history and statutory language of the Civil Rights 
Act and detennined that Congressional intent to apply the new 
provisions retroactively was not justified. Id, at 1489-96. In 
Landgraf the court noted: 
A statement that a statute will become effective on 
a certain date does not even arguably suggest that 
it has any application to conduct that occurred at 
an earlier date. Id. at 1491. 
In the absence of express Congressional intent or 
through application of the rules of statutory interpretation if 
retroactivity is not found, then other rules must be looked to: 
When, however, the statute contains no such 
express command, the court must detennine 
whether the new statute would have retroactive 
effect, i.e., whether it would impair rights a party 
possessed when he acted, increase a party's 
liability for past conduct, or impose new duties 
with respect to transactions already completed. If 
the statute would operate retroactively, our 
traditional presumption teaches that it does not 
govern absent clear congressional intent favoring 
such a result. Id. at 1505. 
In Hughes Aircraft, the Court cautioned that Landgraf 
10 AOL does not argue that Congress has specifically provided for 
retroactive effect of § 230 of the CDA-and Congress undoubtedly could 
have done so. 
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does not purport to define the outer limit of 
impermissible retroactivity. Rather, our opinion 
in Landgraf, like that of Justice Story, merely 
described that any such effect constituted a 
sufficientll , rather than a necessary, condition 
for invoking the presumption against 
retroactivity . . . and made no suggestion that 
Justice Story's formulation was the exclusive 
definition of presumptively impermissible 
retroactive legislation. Hughes Aircraft, 117 
S.Ct. at 1876. 
The Circuit Court appears to hold that retroactively 
(i.e. after all of the seminal events have been completed) 
effecting the elements of causes of action (or completely 
eliminating all available causes of action) is different if the 
party is a plaintiff than if it is a defendant-a one way street 
over which only defendants may travel. Nothing in Landgraf 
as explicated by Hughes Aircrqft so limits the rights free from 
retroactive denial to only defendants or would not extend the 
protection of the law for plaintiffs to events which predated 
the adoption of the legislation. The focus of the 
LandgraflHughes Aircraft analysis is the "potential unfairness 
of retroactive application". Landgraf, 114 S.Ct. at 1501. The 
Court of Appeals quite simply "attached new consequences to 
a completed act". Id. 
It would be manifestly unfair under these circum-
stances to deprive Petitioner of well-established state tort 
remedies against AOL for its negligence in taking no action or 
long-overdue action when finally goaded by the FBI, Secret 
II "i.e whether it would impair rights a party possessed when he acted, 
increase a party's liabiJity for past conduct, or impose new duties with 
respect to transactions already completed." LandgraJat 1505. Arguably if 
the Landgraf examples were the outer limjts of retroactivity; Petitioner's 
rights were sufficiently "impaired" to meet eveD this restrictive standard. 
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Service and local police-turning Section 230's Title literally on 
its head-offering protection for refusing to block and refusing 
to screen the incendiary Ken Z postings. 
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT 
I. 
THE PETITION SHOULD BE GRANTED 
BECAUSE THE ERROR OF THE COURT 
BELOW ADVERSELY IMPACTS THE 
PUBLIC INTEREST AND SAFETY AND TIDS 
CASE PRESENTS THE COURT THE FIRST 
OPPORTUNITY TO INTERPRET THE 
LIMITS OF THE IMMUNITY GRANTED ON 
LINE SERVICE PROVIDERS BY THE CDA. 
The Petitioner's petition for a writ of certiorari should 
be granted because of the major distinctive features of this 
case: (1) it involves a proprietary private member-only on-
line service not the Internet; (2) it involves civil not criminal 
liability; (3) it involves federal law overriding state tort law, 
an area traditionally left to the states, expressly recognized by 
§ 230(d)(3); (4) it is the first case interpreting section 230(c) 
and the interplay between sections 230(c) and 230(d), (5) it is 
of great public importance and interest, and (6) the 
consequence of the decision below is to encourage criminal 
conduct. 
(l) Despite repeated references to the Internet in both 
decisions below, this case involves a very different type of 
'Tinteractive computer service": to go online one has to become 
a member; provide name address, phone number, and credit 
card number' agree to a specified code of online conduct 
("Terms of Service" and "Rules of the Road"), the violation of 
which subject the member to tennination etc. These 
18 
significant differences impact directly on the public policy 
question of imposing distributor liability on an OSP such as 
AOL. 
(2) This Court has previously reviewed the criminal 
provisions of the CDA (47 U.S.c. § 223) in Reno v. American 
Civil Liberties Union, 117 S.Ct. 2329 (1997), which focused 
on the Internet. The Court affirmed the lower court's 
conclusion that prOVlSlons banning "indecent" com-
munications violated the First Amendment, but left the 
prohibitions relating to obscene communications intact. 117 
S.Ct. at 2350. The Court has not yet considered the CDA's 
impact on civil tort liability, an area of growing public impact 
and concern. 
(3) The District Court preempted a traditional area of 
state interest, tort law, because it conflicted with a supposed 
extension of the language of § 230(c) to a distributor (which 
is, of course, not in the section itself) and the purpose 
discerned in the CDA itself by the Court. Zeran, 958 F.Supp. 
at 1133-335. 
Eschewing the traditional preemption analysis used 
below, the Court of Appeals opinion found a purpose of the 
CDA was to "eliminate the threat that tort-based lawsuits pose 
to freedom of speech", which necessitated the extension of 
publisher immunity to distributors. Of course nothing in § 
230(c) refers to any such concern, nor does any of extent 
legislative history. In point of fact, the titles to sections 230 
and 230(c) reflect Congressional concern to the contrary as 
does the CDA-Iimitations on speech by encouraging a 
provider of an interactive computer service to "restrict access 
to or the availability of material that the provider or user 
considers to be obscene . . . harassing, or otherwise 
objectionable, whether or not such material is 
constitutionally protected" (§ 230(c)(2)(A), emphasis 
supplied) and protecting "any action taken to enable or make 
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available to information content providers or others the 
technical means to restrict access to material described in 
paragraph (1)" (§ 230(c)(2)(B). 
Moreover, the Court of Appeals' determination that 
instead "of SUbjecting themselves to possible lawsuits, service 
providers would likely eschew any attempts at self-regulation" 
(129 F.3d at 333), ignores the immunity provided even 
distributors for "any action voluntarily taken in good faith to 
restrict access or availability of material" under § 
230( c )(2)(A). 
(4) No case involving the CDA has yet reached this 
stage and this Petition presents the Court with an opportunity 
to determine these novel issues of public significance. 
(5) This case has already been the subject of a number 
of commentaries. e.g. Sheridan, Zeran v. AOL and the Effect 
of Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act Upon 
Liability for Defamation on the Internet, 61 Albany L.Rev. 
147 (1997), (criticizing the District Court decision)12; BaIlon, 
Defamation and Preemption Under the Telecommunications 
Act of 1996: Why The Fourth Circuit's Ruling in Zeran v. 
America Otlline, Inc. is Wrong, (in press) Journal of Internet 
Law March 1998. 13 
12 The author asserts that imposing liability on the provider is likely the 
only way to protect a defamed plaintiff, observing: 
This is particularly applicable to Zeran. AOL after all 
controlled its own servers, and Zeran had no ability to 
remove the defamatory messages himself. Furthermore, 
since neither Zeran nor AOL could identify the person who 
posted the messages, Zeran could neither motivate that 
person to remove them nor sue him for damages. Id. at 173. 
13 As the title suggests, the author is highly critical of both the decisions 
below. This article will also be contained in the author's treatise, The Law 
of/he Internet (Glasser Legal Works 1998). 
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Additionally, it raises the specter of a totally innocent 
individual being victimized because of corporate policies 
(recruiting new members with trial memberships without 
verifying their identity refusing to notify its members that the 
posting is bogus not adopting available blocking technology 
to stop repeated postings, etc.) deprived of any remedy against 
the party that originally posted (anonymously) and stripped of 
any relief against the OSP responsible for the original posting 
(by not verifying identity and letting the cuJprit online), for 
continuing injuries (by not alerting its members) and for 
subsequent po stings (by not blocking them). The term 
"Kafkaesque" was made for this case. With total impunity for 
its acts14, the public, especially AOL non-members unable to 
defend themselves, are at the mercy of an AOL with no 
interest in carrying out the true purposes of § 230. 
(6) Because AOL's corporate policy allows individuals 
to go online with assurance of escaping detectionlS 
interpreting sections 230(c) and (d)(3) to immunize AOL for 
this negligent act (intentionally undertaken) contradicts a 
specific Congressional purpose expressed in sections 
230(b )(5) and (d)(l )-indeed, it encourages anonymous 
computer crime, crime committed in such a way as to incite 
many others (understandably incensed at the purveyor of the 
"naughty" t-shirts) to violate 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(l)(C) by 
making threatening, harassing phone calls. 
14 AOL contended at the District Court that AOL would be immune 
from liability even if "AOL knew of the defamatory nature of the material 
and made a decision not to remove it from the network based upon a 
malicious desire to cause harm to the party defamed." Zeran, 958 F.Supp. 
at 1 133 n. 20. 
15 The worst fate for such a criminal is to have the bogus membership 
canceled. Of course, as happened here, a new trial membership with yet a 
new identity can be established within minutes and the crime spree 
resumed. 
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The Court should grant certiorari to review these 
matters of great importance and resolve these issues of first 
impression concerning § 230 of the CDA. 
II. 
THE PETITION SHOULD BE GRANTED 
BECAUSE THE COURT OF APPEALS' 
APPLICATION OF THE CDA TO 
RETROACTIVELY BAR PETITIONER'S 
STATE TORT CLAIM CONFLICTS WITH THE 
COURT'S RECENT RETROACTIVITY 
JURISPRUDENCE. 
The Court should grant certiorari to extend its recent 
decisions in Landgraf and Hughes Aircraft to address the 
rights of tort plaintiffs such as Petitioner to recover for 
completed acts of negligence committed before the effective 
date of legislation like the CDA, especially where the 
petitioner clearly manifested reliance upon the law existing at 
the time of the completed events which gave rise to liability 
and took affirmative steps to pursue his available remedies 
and the CDA contains no clear intention to apply 
retroactively. 
There can be no doubt that Petitioner repeatedly 
manifested his reliance upon settled case law long before the 
adoption of the CDA and applying § 230(c) retroactively 
would render it extremely unfair to dismiss plaintiffs claims. [6 
16 The Circuit Court's opinion is clearly incorrect when the court stated: 
Furthermore, Zeran cannot point to any action he took in 
reliance on the law prior to prior to § 230's enactment. 129 
F.3d at 335. 
All of this material was presented to the District Court to rebut an 
argument by AOL that Petitioner's crafty lawyers had concocted a new 
negligence theory to avoid the CDA and that such the court should reject 
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These include: 
1. plaintiff took immediate action to notify AOL of the 
incendiary posting and followed it up with many 
communications to AOL to remove the posting and avoid 
others from being posted (Complaint ~~ 7, 12, 13, 14, 24, 25, 
28, and 33); 
2. AOL failed to take prompt action on plaintiffs 
request to remove the posting, refused to post a retraction or 
notice that the posting was false, and failed to take steps to 
preclude repostings (Complaint, ~~ 42-45); 
3. Because of the negligent manner in which AOL 
solicits its new members, AOL (and the FBI and Secret 
Service too) was, and remains to this day, unable to identify 
the AOL member who joined using bogus information that 
triggered hundreds of criminal, harassing phone calls; the 
person(s) who posted the Ken Z po stings changed his bogus 
information at least twice and used new (deceptively similar) 
screen names. (see Exs. 3, 4 and 5 and Ex. 6, Answer to 
Interrogatory 3, # 15, all attached to Petitioner's Brief in 
Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the 
Pleadings). 
4. Plaintiffs counsel asserted from the earliest time 
that AOL was liable as a distributor and not a publisher, 
establishing plaintiffs reliance on the law as it undeniably 
existed prior to the adoption of the CDA. (Exs. D and E to 
Kayser Aff. attached to Petitioner's Brief in Opposition to 
Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings); 
5. Before the effective date of the CDA, plaintiff 
instituted an action for damages arising from an Oklahoma 
City radio broadcast which was a direct and foreseeable result 
such attempts by "creative litigants". 
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of AOL's negligence; the basic allegations in the Complaint 
against Diamond Broadcasting, Inc. are identical to those in 
the Complaint against AOL. (see footnote 1, supra). 
6. All of the acts which give rise to AOL's tort liability 
occurred (were completed) long before the adoption of the 
CDA. 
The Court should determine that the "potential 
unfairness of retroactive application" under Landgraf and 
Hughes Aircraft precludes the elimination of Petitioner's sole 
remedy by the Court of Appeal's interpretation of retroactivity 
principles. 
CONCLUSION 
This case presents novel questions of exceptional 
importance for the Court and this country and its future. Only 
by addressing these questions can the rights of its citizens and 
the Petitioner be vindicated. The Court faces a "Y" in the road 
on the information superhighway. The choices made by the 
Court will lead us in one direction or the other. Such a 
weighty choice deserves the full consideration by the Court. 
The writ should be granted. 
DATED: March 9, 1998 
Respectfully submitted, 
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QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
1. Whether the Court of Appeals properly applied settled 
rules of statutory construction in detennining that 
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1), which commands that "[n]o 
provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be 
treated as the publisher or speaker of any information 
provided by another information content provider," barred 
Petitioner's cause of action, which sought to hold Respon-
dent America Online, Inc., a provider of an interactive 
computer service, liable for allegedly defamatory mes-
sages provided by a third party. 
2. Whether the Court of Appeals properly applied settled law 
concerning the temporal reach of federal statutes in 
concluding that 47 U.S.C. § 230(d)(3), which provides in 
relevant part that "[n]o cause of action may be brought and 
no liability may be imposed under any State or local law 
that is inconsistent with this section," required application 
of 47 V.S .c. § 230(c)(1) to Petitioner's cause of action, 
which Petitioner did not file until after the statute was 
enacted and became effective. 
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Respondent America Online, Inc ("AOL"), defendant 
below, respectfully opposes the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari 
for the reasons set forth herein. 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED 
The statute at issue in this case is section 509 of the 
Telecommunications Act of1996, now codified at 47 US.C.A. 
§ 230 (West Supp. 1997) ("Section 230"). Because Petitioner 
failed to set out the statute in full in his Petition, the entire text 
of the statute is reprinted in the Appendix to this Opposition. 
COUNTERSTATEMENT 
1. America Online, Inc. AOL operates an interactive 
computer service over which millions of subscribers dissemi-
nate and receive information by means of computer modem 
connections to AOL's computer network. Pet. App. A-3. 
Much of the information transmitted over AOL' s service 
originates with AOL subscribers, who may transmit informa-
tion over AOL's service through a variety of methods, includ-
ing electronic mail (private electronic communications ad-
dressed to specific recipients) and message boards (online areas 
where subscribers may post messages that are then generally 
available for review by other subscribers). Id 
2. The Complaint. According to the Complaint,!I on 
April 25, 1995, an unidentified person using the screen name 
!! Because the courts below adjudicated this case on the basis 
of AOL's motion for judgment on the pleadings, the allegations 
in the complaint were accepted as true. By reciting Zeran's 
allegations, AOL does not concede their truth. 
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"Ken ZZ03"11 posted on an AOL message board a message 
advertising "Naughty Oklahoma T-Shirts" with offensive 
slogans referring to the bombing of the federal building in 
Oklahoma City. Id. The message indicated that anyone 
interested in the t-shirts should contact "Ken" and listed a 
phone number that belonged to Zeran's business, which he 
operated out of his home. Id. Zeran allegedly began receiving 
derogatory and threatening phone calls as a result of the posted 
message. Id. After Zeran learned of the message from the 
phone calls, he allegedly informed AOL that the posting was a 
hoax. and asked that it be removed. Id at A-3 to A-4. 
Shortly after being contacted by Zeran, AOL deleted the 
posted message. Id at A-24. But over the next several days, 
an unidentified person using two slightly different screen 
names posted three similar messages. Id. at A-24 to A-25. 
During this period, Zeran allegedly telephoned AOL on a 
number of occasions to request removal of the messages. Id. 
He allegedly continued to receive unwanted calls about the 
messages. Id. 
On May 1, 1995, someone sent a copy of one of the posted 
messages to an announcer for radio station KRXO in Okla-
homa City. Id at A-4. That day, KRXO allegedly aired a 
7:/ A "screen name" is a unique set of characters (letters or 
numbers) that identifies a person or entity that originates a 
mes~age or posting transmitted via an interactive computer 
servIce or the Internet. AOL permits each of its subscribers to 
have as many as five different screen names of no more than 
ten characters each. It is commonplace for an AOL 
subscriber's screen name(s) to be different from his or her real 
name. 
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broadcast in which the announcer read out parts of the mes-
sage, gave Zeran's business phone number over the air,' and 
encouraged listeners to call the number. Id. As a result of the 
broadcast, Zeran allegedly received death threats and other 
calls with violent language from Oklahoma City. Id 
On January 4, 1996, Zeran filed suit in federal district 
court in Oklahoma against the owner of radio station KRXO. 
Id at A-5. In that suit, he alleged that the station's broadcast in 
which the announcer read aloud portions of one of the posted 
messages constituted defamation, false light invasion of 
privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The 
district court in that case recently granted summary judgment 
in favor of KRXO's owner on each count of Zeran's 
complaint.¥ 
On April 23, 1996, several months after suing KRXO's 
owner and two months after enactment of 47 U.S.C. § 230, 
Zeran filed this separate action against AOL in the same 
Oklahoma district court. Id.!! This suit sought recovery for 
alleged reputational injury and emotional distress caused by the 
allegedly defamatory messages. Zeran alleged that, upon 
notice that the first of the messages was a hoax., AOL had a 
duty to take reasonable care not only to remove that message, 
but also to employ some electronic screening mechanism to 
'J! Zeran v. DiamondBroad. Inc., No. CN-96-0008-T (W.D. 
Okla. Dec. 29, 1997), appeal docketed, Nos. 98-6092,98-6094 
(10th Cir. Mar. 6, 1998). . 
!! Zeran's suit against AOL was subsequently transferred to 
the district court for the Eastern District of Virginia pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). See Pet. App. A-5 . 
4 
prevent the posting of any subsequent messages containing 
Zeran's first name or telephone number. Id at A-24, A-26. 
After filing its Answer, AOL moved for judgment on the 
pleadings pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) on the ground that 
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(I), which prohibits treating interactive 
service providers such as AOL as the "publisher or speaker" of 
third-party content, barred Zeran's action. Id at A-26. 
3. The Decisions Below. On March 21, 1997, the 
District Court granted AOL' s motion for judgment on the 
pleadings. Id at A-21 to A-46. On appeal, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. Id. at A-I to 
A-IS. The Court of Appeals held that Section 230(c)(I) 
precluded suits that "would make service providers liable for 
information originating with a third-party user of the service." 
Id. at A-6 to A-16. The court specifically rejected Zeran's 
claim that Section 230(c)(I) did not apply to "distributors" of 
information, holding that under the general common-law 
meaning of "publisher," distributor liability is "merely a subset, 
or a species, of publisher liability, and is therefore also 
foreclosed by § 230." Id at A-I0. 
The courts below also rebuffed Zeran's argument that 
applying Section 230 to his suit would have an impermissible 
retroactive effect. Id at A-16 to A-IS. Applying this Court's 
familiar Landgraf test, ~ the Court of Appeals found that 
Section 230's command that "[n]o cause of action may be 
brought" under inconsistent state law "applies by its plain 
terms to complaints brought after [Section 230] became 
Landgrafv. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994). 
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effective," regardless of when the underlying events occurred. 
Id. at A-16. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
None of the reasons that this Court typically considers as 
favoring the exercise of its discretionary jurisdiction is present 
here, and there are multiple reasons that affirmatively militate 
against granting the Petition. First and foremost, rather than 
being in conflict with any other decision, the decision below is 
the first (and so far only) decision by any appellate court 
construing 47 U.S.C. § 230, and the Court of Appeals reached 
the same result as all of the reported decisions to date by the 
few trial courts that have construed the relevant provisions of 
this statute. 
Moreover, while this case concerns the relatively new 
medium of interactive computer services, the Petition itself 
presents no legal issue of national importance that would 
warrant the exercise of certiorari jurisdiction in the absence of 
a conflict with other decisions. The Petition presents nothing 
more than ordinary issues of statutory construction of the sort 
that the courts of appeals resolve every day. And these issues 
are narrow in scope, as illustrated by the fact that, in the more 
than two years since the statute was enacted, there have been 
only three other cases in which trial courts have construed 
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(I), and only one other case in which a trial 
court has determined the statute's temporal reach. 
Nor does anything about the nature of the decision below 
warrant further review by this Court. The Court of Appeals 
faithfully adhered to well-settled principles of statutory 
construction and reached a decision that accords fully not only 
with the plain language of the statute, but also with Congress's 
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policy objectives as explicitly stated in the statute's "[f]ind-
ings" and "[p ]olicy" preamble. Petitioner's disagreement with 
the decision below is, at bottom, a disagreement with the basic 
policy choice that Congress expressed in the statute. That is 
not a proper basis for granting further review of the decision. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS' RULING THAT 
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) BARRED PETITIONER'S 
CLAIM DOES NOT MERIT FURTHER REVIEW. 
Congress enacted 47 U.S.C. § 230 in order to eliminate 
uncertainties in the law governing whether providers of 
interactive computer services, such as AOL, could be liable for 
harms resulting from the dissemination of tortious content that 
other persons or entities create and transmit using such 
services.~ In Section 230(c)(I), Congress provided: 
No provider or user of an interactive computer service 
shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any 
information provided by another information content 
provider. (emphasis added) 
§! Section 230 is part of the Communications Decency Act 
("CDA"), two provisions of which this Court struck down on 
First Amendment grounds last Term. Reno v. ACLU, 117 
S. Ct. 2329 (1997) (holding 47 U.S.C. § 223(d) and most of 
47 U.S.C. § 223(a) unconstitutional). The invalidation of these 
other CDA sections did not affect Section 230. See 47 U.S.C. 
§ 60S ("If any provision of this [Act] .. . is held invalid, the 
remainder of the [Act] .. . shall not be affected thereby."); 
Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2350-51 (holding that portion of Section 
223 not implicated by First Amendment ruling remains intact). 
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The court below ruled that this provision bars the imposition of 
liability on AOL for injury allegedly caused by a third party's 
defamatory or otherwise tortious messages. Specifically, it 
held that making AOL liable would impermissibly treat AOL 
(which Petitioner concedes is a "provider of an interactive 
computer service," Pet. App. A-6 n.1S) as the "publisher or 
speaker" of the allegedly tortious messages (which Petitioner 
concedes are "information provided by another information 
content provider," id). 
The Court of Appeals' construction of the term "publisher 
or speaker" as used in Section 230(c)(I) was based on well-
established principles of statutory interpretation and is fully 
consistent with the decision of every other court that has 
construed the term. This holding does not merit further review 
by this Court. 
A. The Decision Below Does Not Conflict With the 
Ruling of Any Other Court. 
As even Petitioner acknowledges, the Court of Appeals' 
decision raises no conflict with any decision in any court. The 
decision below was the first-and thus far only-appellate 
decision involving the interpretation of Section 230. In 
Petitioner's words, this "is the first case interpreting section 
230(c) and the interplay between sections 230(c) and 230(d)," 
and accordingly, "[n]o case involving [Section 230] has yet 
reached this stage." Pet. at 17, 19. Thus, by definition, the 
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decision raises no conflict with another decision of a federal 
court of appeals or state court oflast resort. Sup. Ct. R. 10(a).11 
The decision below does not even conflict with any 
decision in the federal or state trial courts. In fact, we are 
aware of only three other decisions concerning the interpreta-
tion of Section 230(c)(I), all of which reached the same 
conclusion as the courts below in this case. See Blumenthal v. 
Drudge, No. CIV. A 97-1968 PLF, 1998 WL 195979, at **3-5 
(D.D.C. Apr. 22, 1998) (Section 230(c)(I) "effectively 
immunize[ s] providers of interactive computer services from 
civil liability in tort with respect to material disseminated by 
them but created by others"); Doe v. America Online, Inc., No. 
CIV. CL 97-631 AE, 1997 WL 374223, at **2-3 (FI. Cir. Ct. 
June 26, 1997) ("Making AOL liable for [a third-party' s] chat 
room communications would treat AOL as the 'publisher or 
speaker' of those communications" in violation of Section 
230(c)(I).); Aquino v. Electriciti Inc., 26 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 
11 Ironically, Petitioner repeatedly touts the absence of other 
appellate decisions construing Section 230 as if that were a 
reason to grant the Petition. See, e.g., Pet. at 17 ("This case 
presents the Court the first opportunity to interpret the limits of 
the immunity granted online service providers." (emphasis 
added»; id at 21 ("The Court should grant certiorari to ... 
resolve these issues ofJirst impression concerning § 230 of the 
CDA" (emphasis added». This fundamentally misapprehends 
this Court's approach to certiorari review, which generally 
disfavors review of issues for which there has been little or no 
fermentation in the lower courts. See, e.g., McCray v. New 
York, 461 U.S. 961,963 (1983) (Stevens, 1.) (concluding that, 
particularly given the absence of conflict, certiorari should be 
denied to allow "further study" of the issue in lower courts). 
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1032, 1032 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 23, 1997) (dismissing tort 
claims on the basis of Section 230(c)(l».!i Thus, far from 
creating a conflict that might require this Court's attention, the 
decision below simply exemplifies the unanimity of the lower 
courts in their interpretation of Section 230(c)(1). 
B. The Court of Appeals' Decision Was a Correct 
and Straightforward Application of Settled Princi-
ples of Statutory Interpretation. 
The sole legal issue Petitioner raises with respect to the 
operation of Section 230(c)(I) is the meaning of the term 
"publisher or speaker." The Court of Appeals, relying on 
settled principles of statutory construction, determined that 
holding AOL liable for third-party content would treat it as the 
"publisher" of that content in contravention of Section 
230(c)(I). Petitioner's contention that the Court of Appeals 
!! The only other case of which we are aware in which a 
court has construed any of Section 230's operative provisions 
is Mainstream Loudoun v. Loudoun County Library, No. CIV. 
A. 97-2049-A, 1998 WL 164330 (E.D. Va. Apr. 7, 1998). In 
that case, the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Virginia, the same court that issued the original 
decision in this case, held that another part of Section 
230-namely 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)-does not bar a suit 
against a public library challenging on constitutional grounds 
the library's content-based restrictions on Internet access. The 
court in that case appropriately looked to the decision of the 
Court of Appeals in this case for guidance concerning the 
overarching purposes of Section 230. The district court 
decision in Mainstream Loudoun, interpreting a different 
provision of Section 230, does not conflict with the decision of 
the Court of Appeals below. 
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committed an error on this point does not warrant further 
reVIew. 
Because Section 230 does not contain an explicit definition 
of the tenn "publisher," the court below properly turned to the 
common law to detennine its meaning. See, e.g., Gilbert v. 
United States, 370 U.S. 650, 655 (1962) ("[I]n the absence of 
anything to the contrary it is fair to assume that Congress 
use[s a] word in [a] statute in its common-law sense."). As the 
Court of Appeals explained, under the common law, "both the 
negligent communication of a defamatory statement and the 
failure to remove such a statement when first communicated by 
another party--each alleged by Zeran here under a negligence 
label-constitute publication." Pet. App. A-I0 (citing Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts § 558(b) (1977)); see also Restatement 
§ 577 ("One who intentionally and unreasonably Jails to 
remove defamatory matter that he knows to be exhibited on 
land or chattels in his possession or under his control is subject 
to liability for its continued publication." (emphasis added)). 
Accordingly, in the context of torts such as defamation, 
distributors are merely a type of publisher: "Those who are in 
the business of making their facilities available to disseminate 
the writings composed, the speeches made, and the infonnation 
gathered by others may also be regarded as participating to 
such an extent in making the ... infonnation available to others 
as to be regarded as publishers." W. Page Keeton et aI., 
Prosser and Keeton on the Law oj Torts 803 (5th ed. 1984). 
Indeed, basic hornbook law provides that an entity may be 
liable for harm caused by a defamatory statement if and only if 
the entity "published" the statement. Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 558 (1977) (essential elements of any defamation 
action include both "an unprivileged publication to a third 
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party" and "fault amounting at least to negligence on the part 
of the publisher" (emphasis added)). 
In the face of this unequivocal common law background, 
Petitioner essentially concedes that holding a distributor such 
as AOL liable for third-party content would treat it as a 
"publisher" under the common law usage of the term. See Pet. 
at 12. He claims, however, that Congress intended to imple-
ment a "narrow definition" of the term that did not include 
distributors, a definition that he alleges is embodied in two 
earlier trial court decisions, Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe Inc., 
776 F. Supp. 135 (SD.N.Y. 1991) and Stratton-Oakmont, Inc. 
v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WI.. 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 
24, 1995). Pet. at 12. The court below considered and rejected 
this argument, correctly concluding that neither Stratton-
Oakmont nor Cubby supports the proposition that holding a 
distributor liable for disseminating defamatory content would 
not treat the distributor as the "publisher" of that content.2' 
As the Court of Appeals observed, although both Stratton-
Oakmont and Cubby recognized a legal distinction between 
publishers and distributors, "this distinction signifies only that 
different standards of liability may be applied within the larger 
2' The courts in both Blumenthal and Doe expressly con-
sidered and rejected the very same argument that Petitioner 
raises here. See Blumenthal, 1998 WL 195979, at *7 ("Any 
attempt to distinguish between 'publisher' liability and notice-
based ' distributor' liability and to argue that Section 230 was 
only intended to immunize the former would be unavailing. "); 
Doe, 1997 WL 374223, at *3 ("[T]o hold AOL liable for 
negligently 'distributing' [third-party content] .. . would treat 
AOL as the 'publisher or speaker' of those statements."). 
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publisher category; depending on the specific type of publisher 
concerned." Pet. App. A-II. In particular, those decisions 
merely identified the well-established constitutional and 
common law principle that the First Amendment provides a 
"deeply rooted" protection for distributors such as interactive 
service providers and that, as a result, such a provider may be 
held liable as the publisher of defamatory third-party content 
only if it "knew or should have known" of the defamation. 
Cubby, 776 F. Supp. at 139-41 (citing Smith v. California, 361 
U.S. 147, 152-53 (1959)); Stratton-Oakmont, 1995 WL 
323710, at *3. But while those decisions describe the different 
standards of liability for publishers and distributors, they "do 
not ... suggest that distributors are not also a type of publisher 
for purposes of defamation law." Pet. App. at A-II to A-12. 
Having applied well-established principles of statutory 
interpretation to determine that holding AOL liable would treat 
it as a "publisher" in contravention of Section 230(c)(I), the 
Court of Appeals confirmed its conclusion by analyzing 
whether such a meaning was consistent with and would further 
the purposes of Section 230. Pet. App. at A-12 to A-14. This 
approach, far from being a "manifest[] depart[ ure] from any 
accepted rule of judicial construction and [ an] inva[ sion of] the 
province of the legislature," Pet. at 13, was again the method 
required by accepted principles of statutory interpretation. See, 
e.g., Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 158 (1990) ("In 
determining the meaning of the statute, we look not only to the 
particular statutory language, but to the design of the statute as 
a whole and to its object and policy."). 
Determining the purposes of Section 230 was a straightfor-
ward task: Congress explicitly stated its goals in the "Findings" 
and "Policy" statement set out in the preamble of the statute. 
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47 U.S.C. §§ 230(a)-(b). These introductory sections-which 
Petitioner almost completely ignores-are the type of clear and 
reliable evidence of Congress' purposes and goals on which 
this Court routinely relies.!QI The preamble announces, inter 
alia, congressional findings that "interactive computer services 
offer a forum for a true diversity of political discourse, unique 
opportunities for cultural development, and myriad avenues for 
intellectual activity" and that these services have "flourished, 
to the benefit of all Americans, with a minimum of government 
regulation." 47 U.S.C. §§ 230(a)(3)-(4) (emphasis added). 
The preamble further declares that it is "the policy of the 
United States ... to preserve the vibrant and competitive free 
market that presently exists for the Internet and other interac-
tive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regula-
tion." Id § 230(b)(2) (emphasis added). Viewed in the context 
of the whole of Section 230, these declarations reflect Con-
gress's view that a legal regime under which interactive 
computer service providers could face tort liability for dissemi-
nation of content produced by others inevitably would hurt the 
development of an emerging communications medium that 
obviously holds great promise. 
At the same time, Section 230's preamble reflects that 
Congress recognized the need to deter and punish truly harmful 
online speech and chose to do so by strengthening enforcement 
of federal criminal laws against the actual wrongdoers who 
originate such speech. The preamble declares that it is the 
.ill' See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 499 US. 160, 177 (1991); 
Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 13 n.12 (1979); Tilton v. 
Richardson, 403 US. 672, 678 (1971); American Trucking 
Ass'ns. v. United States, 364 US. 1,6 (1960). 
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"policy of the United States ... to ensure vigorous enforcement 
of Federal criminal laws to deter and punish trafficking in 
obscenity, stalking, and harassment by means of computer." 
Id. § 230(b)(5). Thus, Congress made the policy decision to 
deter tortious online speech not by punishing the intermedi-
ary-as Petitioner's suit would do-but by strengthening the 
enforcement of legal remedies against the culpable source of 
the unlawful content. 
Having recited these congressional purposes, the court 
below correctly found that the rule of law advocated by 
Petitioner-that an interactive computer service should be 
liable for injury caused by a series offalse third-party messages 
once it is notified that one of its millions of users has posted 
one such message--would undermine Congress' goals. Such 
a rule would run directly counter to the express statutory policy 
that such services be "unfettered by Federal or State regula-
tion." 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2). Moreover, as the Court of 
Appeals accurately discerned, Pet. App. A-I3 to A-I4, it would 
also have the perverse effect of undermining the statute's clear 
objective to remove disincentives for interactive computer 
services voluntarily to engage in self-regulatory activities 
designed to restrict the availability of material that they 
consider to be objectionable. As the Court of Appeals ex-
plained, under the rule advocated by Petitioner, "[a]ny efforts 
by a service provider to investigate and screen material posted 
on its service would only lead to notice of potentially defama-
tory material more frequently and thereby create a stronger 
basis for liability. Instead of subjecting themselves to further 
possible lawsuits, service providers would likely eschew any 
attempts at self-regulation." Pet. App. A-13 to A-I4. 
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Furthermore, as the Court of Appeals recognized, notice-
based liability would have a chilling effect on speech over 
interactive services, contrary to Congress' intent that these 
services continue to flourish as "a forum for a true diversity of 
political discourse, unique opportunities for cultural develop-
ment, and myriad avenues for intellectual activity." 47 U.S.C. 
§ 230(a)(4). Under Petitioner's theory, once a service provider 
received notice of a possibly tortious message, it would face 
potential liability and have to make a "careful yet rapid 
investigation of the circumstances surrounding the posted 
information, a legal judgment concerning the information's 
defamatory character, and an on-the-spot editorial decision 
whether to risk liability by allowing the continued publication 
of that information." Pet. App. A-13. Even assuming that 
were practical given the sheer number of postings on interac-
tive computer services, such a rule would result in the suppres-
sion of speech: "Because service providers would be subject 
to liability only for the publication of information, and not for 
its removal, they would have a natural incentive simply to 
remove messages upon notification, whether the contents were 
defamatory or not." Id Such results would frustrate Congress' 
intent. 
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS' HOLDING THAT 
47 U.S.C. § 230 APPLIES TO THIS CASE EVEN 
THOUGH THE EVENTS ALLEGED IN THE 
COMPLAINT PRE-DATE ITS ENACTMENT DOES 
NOT MERIT FURTHER REVIEW. 
Petitioner also challenges the Court of Appeals' applica-
tion of this Court's Landgraf test for determining whether 
Section 230 governs this case, which, though it involves events 
pre-dating the enactment of Section 230, was filed after the 
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date of enactment. The court below held that Section 230 
applies in these circumstances based on the plain meaning of 
the second sentence of Section 230(d)(3), which provides: 
No cause of action may be brought and no liability 
may be imposed under any State or local law that is 
inconsistent with this section. 
The Court of Appeals' decision on this point does not 
merit further review for at least three reasons. First, this ruling 
represents the first and (so far) only appellate decision concern-
ing this issue and is identical to the trial court ruling in the only 
other case in which this issue has been decided. Second, the 
decision raises no issue of national importance, particularly 
given that in the more than two years Section 230 has been law, 
this case is one of only two of which we are aware that have 
raised any issue concerning the temporal reach of Section 230. 
Third, the court below, following this Court's precedents, 
applied the undisputedly appropriate legal framework to reach 
the correct result. 
A. The Decision Below Is Not in Conflict with the 
Decision of Any Other Court. 
As with the Court of Appeals' construction of Section 
230(c)(1), its decision concerning the temporal reach of 
Section 230 creates no conflict with the decision of any other 
court. Aside from the present case, the issue has not been 
decided in any federal court of appeals or state court of last 
resort. Indeed, the only other decision to date concerning 
Section 230' s temporal reach was a decision last year by a state 
trial-level court, Doe v. America Online, Inc., No. CIV. CL 97-
631 AE, 1997 WL 374223 (Fla. Cir. Ct. June 26,1997). Citing 
the federal district court's carefully-reasoned decision in this 
17 
case, that court also ruled that the plain language of Section 
230(d)(3) required applying the statute to all cases brought 
after its enactment, regardless of when the underlying events 
occurred. See id at *4. Accordingly, this case presents no 
conflict for this Court to resolve. 
B. Section 230's Temporal Reach Is Not an Issue of 
National Importance. 
The question of whether Section 230 controls cases filed 
after the statute was enacted and became effective but involv-
ing some events that predate enactment is particularly unwor-
thy of further review because, even assuming arguendo that the 
decision were wrong, its implications are extremely narrow. 
Indeed, there is every reason to believe that the Court of 
Appeals' ruling on this issue will be significant to no one other 
than the Petitioner himself and, at most, a small handful of 
other current or prospective plaintiffs. See generally Rice v. 
Sioux City Cemetery, 349 U.S. 70, 79 & n.2 (1955) (certiorari 
is inappropriate where "the question [is] of importance merely 
to the litigants and [does] not present an issue of immediate 
public significance"). 
As already noted, since Section 230 was enacted and 
became effective on February 8, 1996, this case and Doe v. 
America Online, which also involved only one plaintiff, are the 
only cases of which we are aware in which any court has 
considered whether Section 230 applies to all cases filed after 
it was enacted, regardless of when the events at issue took 
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place.!Y We are not aware of any other case that has been filed 
against AOL or any other interactive computer service in which 
this issue has arisen or may arise. 
Moreover, given that Section 230 has been law for more 
than two years, few, if any, additional cases are likely to be 
filed that will implicate the applicability of Section 230 to pre-
enactment events. Indeed, even assuming that other possible 
plaintiffs have a potential claim implicating application of 
Section 230 and arising out of facts that predate its enactment, 
their claims are likely to be barred on other threshold grounds 
such as statutes of limitations, which are often two years or less 
for torts such as defamation.!Y 
Finally, the decision below concerning the temporal reach 
of Section 230 is unlikely to have any significant ramification 
!Y One other case now pending in a state court may present 
the related, but distinct, question of whether Section 230 
controls a case that was already pending when the statute was 
enacted. Lunney v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 21886/94 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. Jan. 13, 1998), appeal docketed, No. 97-07342 (N.Y. 
App. Div. Jan. 29, 1998). In that case, the New York trial court 
denied defendant Prodigy's motion for summary judgment on 
solely State procedural grounds, without even construing any 
part of Section 230, much less determining its temporal reach. 
Id 
!Y For example, all but six states (Arkansas, Massachusetts, 
New Hampshire, New Mexico, Rhode Island, and Vermont) 
have a statute of limitations period for defamation actions that 
is two years or less. See Robert D. Sack & Sandra S. Baron, 
Libel, Slander, and Related Problems 835 (2d ed. 1994 & 
Supp. 1997). 
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outside the limited context of cases in which Section 230 is 
raised as a defense. As discussed in greater detail in the next 
section, the decision below broke no new ground, but rather 
applied well-settled retroactivity jurisprudence to the particular 
language of 47 U.S.C. § 230(d)(3). Because the Court of 
Appeals' analysis was primarily based on the statute's plain 
language, its ruling will have little or no relevance to cases 
involving other statutes. 
Given the extremely circumscribed impact of the decision 
below, this case does not present any important question of 
federal law and does not warrant further review by this Court. 
C. The Decision Below, Rather Than Conflicting 
With This Court's Retroactivity Jurisprudence, 
Simply Involved a Straightforward Application of 
the Analytical Framework Articulated in This 
Court's Prior Decisions. 
Although Petitioner claims that the decision below 
somehow conflicts with this Court's retroactivity decisions, the 
Court of Appeals faithfully applied this Court's framework for 
analyzing the temporal reach of federal statutes and correctly 
concluded that, under that framework, Section 230 governs 
Petitioner's claim. Moreover, Petitioner's entire retroactivity 
attack on the opinion below concerns a single paragraph in the 
decision that was not even necessary to the court's decision, 
further obviating any need for further review of this case. 
In both Landgraf and Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States 
ex reI Schumer, 117 S. Ct. 1871 (1997), this Court held that the 
first step in a retroactivity analysis is "to determine whether 
Congress has expressly prescribed the statute's proper reach," 
in which case that prescription governs. Landgraf, 511 U. S. at 
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280. Despite Petitioner's inexplicable assertion that AOL does 
not rely on this step of the analysis, Pet. at 15 n.10, the Court 
of Appeals properly concluded that "[t]his case can be resolved 
at this first step." Pet. App. A-17. Petitioner's utter failure 
even to address this step of the analysis is reason enough to 
deny certiorari on the issue of Section 230's temporal reach. 
Section 230(d)(3) expressly provides that "[n]o cause of 
action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under 
any State or local law that is inconsistent with this section." 
47 U.S.C. § 230(d)(3). This clear language led the Court of 
Appeals to hold that "Section 230 applies by its plain terms to 
complaints brought after the CDA became effective," even if 
the events at issue occurred before the statute's enactment. Pet. 
App. A-16. Congress could not have expressed its intent more 
clearly: from the date of Section 230's enactment (February 8, 
1996), no action may be filed and no liability may be imposed 
under any State or local law inconsistent with Section 230, 
regardless of when the underlying events occurred. Congress' 
"use of . . . absolute language" left no room for courts to 
determine whether the statute should apply only to some cases 
filed after its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 117 S. Ct. 2059, 
2064 n.4 (1997). Thus, because Petitioner's suit was filed after 
enactment of Section 230, a straightforward interpretation of 
Section 230(d)(3) requires the application of Section 230 to 
this case. 
Indeed, as the Court of Appeals noted, "it is doubtful that 
a retroactivity issue is even presented here." Pet. App. A-16. 
Section 230(d)(3) addresses only conduct related to litiga-
tion-the bringing of a lawsuit and the imposition of liability. 
Because Petitioner did not file his complaint until after Section 
230 was enacted and became effective, "the statute's applica-
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tion in this litigation is in fact prospective." Id; see also 
Vernon v. Cassadaga Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 49 F.3d 886, 889-
90 (2d Cir. 1995) (statute applied prospectively because it 
"applied to conduct that occur[red] after the statute's enact-
ment-plaintiff's filing of the complaint-not the defendant's 
allegedly unlawful acts. "); St. Louis v. Texas Worker's Com-
pensation Comm 'n, 65 F.3d 43,46 (5th Cir. 1995) (same). 
Although the Court of Appeals recognized that its conclu-
sion that Congress had clearly expressed its intent that Section 
230 apply to all suits brought after its enactment resolved 
Petitioner's retroactivity claim, it briefly noted that Petitioner's 
argument would in any case also fail under the second prong of 
the Landgraf test. Pet. App. A-18. Petitioner's entire argu-
ment on retroactivity is directed to this brief discussion by the 
Court of Appeals. See Pet. at 14-17, 21-23. But, given the 
Court of Appeals' ruling as to the clear intent of the statute, its 
examination of the second prong of the Landgraf test was not 
even necessary for its decision. Thus, even if this Court 
believed that the court below had erred in its application of the 
second step of the Landgraf framework, this case would not 
present a suitable vehicle for review of that issue. 
In any case, the Court of Appeals was correct when it 
determined that, even in the absence of clear Congressional 
intent, Section 230 would apply to this case because doing so 
would not have an impermissible retroactive effect. Landgraf, 
511 U.S. at 280. A law has retroactive effect only when its 
application to pre-enactment events would be unfair because a 
party has relied upon the pre-existing law in planning his or her 
conduct. . As the Landgraf Court explained, "[e]lementary 
considerations of fairness dictate that individuals should have 
an opportunity to know what the law is and to conform their 
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conduct accordingly." Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 265. In other 
words" the presumption against retroactivity is designed to 
avoid the unfairness of changing the legal rules when a person 
has engaged in conduct with an expectation of the probable 
legal consequences. 
As the Court of Appeals concluded, however, "Zeran 
cannot point to any action he took in reliance on the law prior 
to § 230's enactment." Pet. App. A-IS. Clearly, his alleged 
actions in responding to the messages on AOL's system by 
complaining to AOL were not premised in any way on existing 
legal rules. Indeed, he cannot even claim that he filed suit 
against AOL in reliance on pre-Section 230 law because the 
statute was enacted before he brought suit. The only "reliance 
interest" Petitioner claims-or can claim-is that he relied on 
his understanding of that law as the basis for this suit.llI The 
unfairness to which Petitioner points is not any change in the 
ill Petitioner's list of the six ways he "repeatedly manifested 
his reliance upon settled case law" only demonstrates his lack 
of any cognizable reliance. Pet. at 21-23. The second item on 
his list concerns actions taken by AOL, not Petitioner. The 
third and sixth are merely factual statements that the original 
party who posted the messages remains unidentified and that 
the events at issue occurred prior to enactment of Section 230. 
Nothing in the Complaint indicates that Petitioner's 
notification of AOL when he first learned of the postings was 
based in any way on reliance on any rule of law. The 
remaining two items on Petitioner's list concern litigation 
decisions (such as bringing suit) that would apply in any case 
raising retroactivity issues and therefore cannot be the type of 
conduct that the presumption against retroactivity protects. 
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consequences of his own past actions, but an alleged unfairness 
of not having a claim against AOL. 
But that is not the type of "reliance" or "unfairness" the 
presumption against retroactivity protects. After all, courts 
often apply statutes to suits involving pre-enactment events 
even though the effect is to eliminate the claim upon which the 
plaintiff was relying to seek redress for alleged wrongs. As 
Justice Scalia observed in Landgraf, the general rule is that a 
statute eliminating jurisdiction is applied to cases involving 
pre-enactment events, even though doing so "can deny a 
litigant a forum for his claim entirely." Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 
292-93 (Scalia, 1., concurring). 
Thus, the decision below concerning whether 'Section 230 
applied to this case raises no significant legal issue worthy of 
review. The Court of Appeals unquestionably applied the 
appropriate legal test and reached the correct result. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Petition for a Writ of Certiorari should be denied. 
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Petitioner Kenneth M. Zeran ("ZERAN") respectfully 
submits his reply to the Opposition of America Online, Inc. 
("AOL") to the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari filed by 
ZERAN. ("AOL Opp."). Primarily, AOL argues that this 
case is not worthy of review by the Court because of the very 
nature of its precedent-setting, landmark status (AOL Opp. 
7-9) and because the retroactive application of § 230 of the 
Communications Decency Act (47 U.S.C. § 230, "CDA") is 
not of national importance. (AOL Opp.l7-19). Additionally, 
AOL asserts at length that the court below correctly decided 
the case. (AOL Opp. 9-17, 19-23). 
I. This Case is Worthy of Certiorari 
Since the exercise of the Court's certiorari is 
admittedly not subject to a mechanical fonnula and involves 
an often complex and variable set of recognized factors l , 
ZERAN submits that, when considered on the whole and 
contrary to AOL's opposition, this case is appropriate for the 
Court's review by certiorari. These factors include: 
A. The Effects of the CDA on Petitioner's 
Claims 
1. The Courts Below Misconstrued the CDA 
While the Court does not routinely grant certiorari 
solely because the courts below committed error2, AOL 
asserts as a ground for denial of certiorari that the decisions 
below were correct. 
I These factors are outlined in Stem Gressman, Shapiro and Geller, 
Supreme Court Practice §§ 4.11-4.17 (7th ed. 1993) ("Supreme Court 
Practice") and in publ ications of many of the Court's former and present 
Justices. e.g. Rehnquist, Oral Advocacy: A Disappearing Act, 35 Mercer 
L. Rev. 1015 (1984). 
2 Supreme Court Practice, supra, § 4.17. 
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In advancing this argument, AOL has reproduced the 
fundamental flaw in the decisions below- that because the 
CDA does not include or define "distributor", congressional 
intent must be deduced from reference to the common law of 
defamation for § 230 (c) and from generalized statements of 
congressional intent for § 230(d) (3). (AOL Opp. 10-13). 
First, this ignores the language of the CDA itself 
which contains the terms "publisher or speaker" and 
pointedly omits "distributor". The court should not have 
supplied language (equating publisher and distributor) 
Congress chose to omit. 
Second, the opmlOn elevates the generalized 
statements of congressional findings and intent (§§ 230(a) 
and (b), (AOL Opp.12-13) over the specific title of § (c) 
"Protection for 'Good Samaritan' Blocking and Screening 
of Offensive Material". Congress adopted §§(c) (1) and (2) 
for a specific purpose- to encourage action by an interactive 
computer service3 to police its service without fear of 
publisher or speaker liability. Instead, the opinion rewards 
inaction in blocking and screening offensive material by a 
distributor. In fact- each of AOL's arguments defeat the 
undisputed purpose of230(c). 
Third, the opinion pointedly ignores expressions of 
specific congressional intent with regard to §§ 230(c) and 
(d) (3), both in the legislative historl and comments on the 
3 As it relates to this appeal, AOL is a private, proprietary, member-only 
on-line service provider ("OSP") where members provide name, address, 
phone number, and credit card number and agree to a specified code of 
online conduct ("Terms of Service" and "Rules of the Road"), the 
violation of which subject the member to termination. 
4 The Conference Report on Section 230 stated: 
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floor of Congress by lts authors5 and the context of Stratton-
Oakmont Inc. v. Prodigy Service Co., Inc., 1995 WL 323710 
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. May 24, 1995) (publisher Hability imposed 
because of policing efforts) and Cubby, Inc. v. 
CompuServe, Inc. el al., 776 F.Supp. 135 (S.D-N.Y. 
1991) (OSP distributor must be placed on notice of the 
contents of a publication before liability can be imposed 
for electronic distribution of publication). Congress could 
easily have cited Cubby, Inc. in the Conference Report and 
the authors could have invoked Cubby, Inc. in debate as an 
example of impediments to achieving the purposes of § 
230(c) but did neither. The court should not have repealed 
Cubby, Inc. when Congress chose not to do so. 
Finally, the court should not have extended § 230( d) 
(3) to preempt state-based tort liability under the generalized 
statements of congressional intent without more definitive 
language, especially when Congress specifically chose to 
allow the continuation of distributor liability. Maintenance 
One of the specific purposes of [Section 230] is to overrule 
Stratton-Oakmont v. Prodigy and any other similar decisions 
which have treated such providers and users as publishers or 
speakers of content that is not their own because they have 
restricted access to objectionable material. (Emphasis added.) 
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-458, at 194 (1996) 
5 In a floor colloquy between the House authors, Congressman Cox 
stated: 
Currently, however, there is a tremendous disincentive for online 
service providers to create family friendly services by detecting 
and removing objectionable content. These providers face the risk 
of increased liabiHty if they police their systems . .. The Cox-
Wyden amendment removes the liability of providers such as 
Prodigy who currently make a good faith effort to edit the smut 
from their systems. 141 Congo Rec. H. 8460, 8471 (August 5, 
1995). 
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of ZERAN's distributor claims was not inconsistent with § 
230 (c) and the court erred in holding that it was barred. 
2. This Case Squarely Presents an Important 
Issue of Federal Law with Significant Practical 
Consequences. 
Paradoxically, on one hand AOL characterizes this 
case as not deserving of certiorari because it does not create 
a split in the courts (AOL Opp. 7- 8), and on the other, 
counsels the court to await further study in the lower courts. 
(AOL Op. ft. 7). Of course, after this due study, should a 
court refuse to follow the Fourth Circuit opinion, AOL will 
undoubtedly be back before this Court seeking certiorari, 
extolling the public importance of resolving the reach of the 
CDA. 
Rather than being a basis for denying certiorari, the 
landmark status of this case presents an important question 
of first impression, a ground for granting certiorari the 
Court has acknowledged countless times. Moreover, as 
demonstrated by AOL's citation of trailing cases (AOL Opp. 
8-9) that have uniformly relied on the lower court decisions 
in this case6 the reach of the CDA presented in this appeal 
will undoubtedly spawn recurring litigation.? 
6 e.g. In Blumenthal v. Drudge. 1998 WL 195979 (D.D.C April 22, 
1998) the court found "The court in Zeran has provided a complete 
answer to plaintiffs' primary argument, an answer grounded in the 
statutory language and intent of Section 230." 
7 The in pres~ article cited by Petitioner (Pet. 19) has now been 
published, Bailon, Defamation and Preemption Under the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996: Why The Fourth Circuit's Ruling in 
Zeran v. America Online, Inc. is Wrong, Journal of Internet Law, March 
1998,6-13. 
5 
Also, in addition to the obvious effect the decisions 
below are having on burgeoning OSP litigation, the impact 
of this case transcends the fate of ZERAN- it potentially 
reaches into the lives of millions of Americans and renders 
them vulnerable to computer-based crime without a 
remedy.8 And as the presence of computers grow more 
ubiquitous in our everyday life, the fallout of the lower court 
opinions will be magnified. 
The Court has an opportunity to revitalize 
Congress' expressed standards of conduct for the coming 
millennium. The Court should not await "percolation" in 
the courts below of an erroneous construction of a federal 
statute which would bar access to both state and federal 
courts for persons injured as a result of the negligence of 
proprietary, private OSP's like AOL. Rather, it should decide 
this important, unsettled question of federal statutory law of 
broad public interest and safety. 
3. This Case Has No Other Impediments to the 
Grant of Certiorari. 
None of the traditional bases for denial of certiorari 
exist-the decision is not grounded on unique facts and there 
are no seriously disputed facts9; the case comes to the Court 
8 In Zeran v. AOL and the Effect of Section 230 of the Communications 
Decency Act Upon Liability for Defamation on the Internet, 61 Albany L. 
Rev. 147 (1997), the author asserts that imposing liability on the provider 
is likely the only way to protect a defamed plaintiff, observing: 
This is particularly applicable to Zeran. AOL after all controlled 
its own servers, and Zeran had no ability to remove the 
defamatory messages himself. Furthermore, since neither Zeran 
nor AOL could identify the person who posted the messages, 
Zeran could neither motivate that person to remove them nor sue 
him for damages. Id. at 173. 
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from a grant of judgment on the pleadings, a well-worn 
path to the Court; there are no procedural defects or any 
likelihood that the dispute might be rendered moot or that the 
Court might decide another case in the interim which would 
justify a granted, vacated and remand treatment. In short, the 
case has none of the shortcomings which, can result in a 
denial of certiorari. 
B. The Retroactivity of the CDA 
1. The Circuit Court's Retroactive Application 
of the CDA to ZERAN's Claim Conflicts with the 
Court's Latest Retroactivity Cases. 
AOL asserts that the Circuit Court's opinion is 
consistent with Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 
244, 114 S.Ct. 1483 (1994) and Hughes Aircraft Co. v. 
Us. ex reI. Schumer, U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 1871. (AOL Opp. 
19-23). In essence, AOL would characterize the denial of 
any remedy to ZERAN for injuries suffered prior to the 
enactment of the CDA arising from completed conduct 
which occurred (and all elements of liability had ripened) 
long prior to the CDA as not being "unfair" under Landgraf 
(AOL Opp. 21).10 Of course, were AOL to be deprived of a 
9 However, AOL repeats the mistake committed by the Circuit Court that 
"Shortly after being contacted by Zeran, AOL deleted the messages." 
(AOL Opp.2). To the contrary, the Complaint does not aUege that AOL 
deleted tIle posting, but only that on Aprjl 28, 1995, ZERAN was told by 
an AOL servi-ce representative that it would be deleted (~ 16, Comp'lamt) 
and that he received the same promise on May 2, 1995. (~28). 
10 AOL acknowledges that the "presumption against retroactivity is 
designed to avoid the unfairness of changing the legal rules when a 
person has engaged in conduct with an expectation of the probable legal 
consequences", but asserts that ZERAN failed to sufficiently establish his 
reliance. (AOL Opp. 22). However, it is unclisputed that both AOL and 
ZERAN considered AOL a distributor, not a publisher, and entitled to 
notice. AOL's reliance upon the settled state of law pre-CDA was also 
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defense to such liability, it would immediately urge that it 
was "unfair" to "attach new consequences to a completed 
act". Landgraf, 114 S.Ct. at 1501. 
AOL also claims that a statute eliminating 
jurisdiction can be applied to pre-enactment events, so as to 
"deny a litigant a forum for his claim entirely", citing Justice 
Scalia concurring in Landgraf (AOL Opp. 23). However, 
the Court recently held in Hughes Aircraft Co. that 
jurisdictional statutes effect only where a suit may be 
brought not whether it may be brought at all. 117 S.Ct. at 
1878. Nothing in the majority opinion in Landgraf or 
Hughes Aircraft Co. would allow the CDA to be exempt 
from the general presumption against retroactivity so as to 
deprive ZERAN of any forum in which to bring his claims. 
The retroactive application of the CDA, especially 
when Congress knows exactly how to retroactively apply 
litigation barriers and chose not to do so in the CDA, creates 
not only "potential" unfairness, but concrete, actual 
unfairness to Zeran and others similarly harmed. 
The Court should grant certiorari on the retroactivity 
issue because the opinion below conflicts with this Court's 
retroactivity jurisprudence. 
CONCLUSION 
Because this appeal presents important Issues of 
federal law with significant practical consequences, 
manifestly represents the first of many recurring cases, 
presents profound questions for our country's expanding on-
line future, and offers the Court the opportunity to choose 
which road on the information superhighway we shall travel, 
established in the pleadings. The application of the CDA to bar 
ZERAN'S recovery undoubtedly has retrospective effect. 
8 
the Court should grant the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari 
and afford this case the full consideration of the Court. 
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